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Ethical, Legal, Social, and 
Policy Issues in the Use of 
Genomic Technology by the U.S. 
Military1 
Maxwell J. Mehlman2 & Tracy Yeheng Li  
Advances in genomic science are attracting the interest of 
the U.S. military for their potential to improve medical care for 
members of the military and to aid in military recruitment, 
training, specialization, and mission accomplishment. While 
researchers have explored the ethical, legal, and social issues 
raised by the use of genomic science in a wide variety of 
contexts, there has been virtually no examination of these issues 
in connection with the use of genomics by the military. This 
article identifies potential uses of genomic science by the 
military, proposes an applicable ethical and legal framework, 
and applies the framework to provide ethical and legal guidance 
for military decision-makers. 
 
1. This article originally appeared in the September 2014 issue of the 
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International Law thanks the Journal of Law and the Biosciences for 
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2. Maxwell J. Mehlman is Distinguished University Professor, Arthur E. 
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I. Introduction 
The U.S. military is beginning to employ genetic and genomic 
science to achieve military objectives, and is planning to expand these 
efforts in the future. In December 2010, JASON, a group of scientific 
advisors to the military, issued a report entitled “The $100 Genome: 
Implications for the Department of Defense” that outlined an 
ambitious plan to employ genomic technologies to “enhance medical 
status and improve treatment outcomes,” enhance “health, readiness, 
and performance of military personnel,” and “know the genetic 
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identities of an adversary.”3 The report also called for the Department 
of Defense (DoD) to take advantage of its “large, well-defined 
population in generally good health, together with their medical 
records” to “facilitate valuable longitudinal studies correlating 
genotype and phenotype.”4 The report went on to recommend that 
DoD: 
[D]etermine which phenotypes that might reasonably be 
expected to have a genetic component have special relevance to 
military performance and medical cost containment. These 
phenotypes might pertain to shortand long-term medical 
readiness, physical and mental performance, and response to 
drugs, vaccines, and various environmental exposures, all of 
which will have different features in a military context. More 
specifically, one might wish to know about phenotypic responses 
to battlefield stress, including post-traumatic stress disorder, the 
ability to tolerate conditions of sleep deprivation, dehydration, 
or prolonged exposure to heat, cold, or high altitude, or the 
susceptibility to traumatic bone fracture, prolonged bleeding, or 
slow wound healing.5  
The JASON report also included in its “major recommendation” 
that DoD establish “policies that result in . . . the resolution of ethical 
and social issues that arise from these activities.”6 Since the inception 
of the Human Genome Project in 1990, the Ethical, Legal, and Social 
Implications (ELSI) Research Program within the National Human 
Genome Research Institute at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
has funded a substantial body of research on the ethical, legal, social, 
and policy implications of this scientific initiative and subsequent 
scientific developments. However, virtually none of this research has 
addressed issues raised by the use of genomic technology by the 
military. Moreover, in view of differences between the military and 
civilian realms, the extent to which the insights from the ELSI 
program would apply to the military is unclear. 
This paper is an effort to adapt the knowledge generated by the 
ELSI program to the U.S. military. It begins by describing current 
and potential uses of genomic technology7 by the military. It then 
 
3. JASON PROGRAM, THE $100 GENOME: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOD 1 
(Dec. 2010), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/ 
hundred.pdf (accessed May 2, 2014) [hereinafter, JASON Report]. 
4. Id. at 43. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 50. 
7. Technically, the term “genetic” refers to a particular gene while 
“genomic” refers to the entire genome. See Talking Glossary of Genetic 
Terms, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/ 
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describes how civilian norms and values are a poor fit with the 
military, and how this limits the application of existing ELSI findings 
to the military. The paper next describes the ethical, legal, social, and 
policy issues that would be raised by military genomics, and after 
explaining how these issues would be resolved according to the lessons 
learned in the ELSI program, it proposes how the issues should be 
handled in the military.8  
II. Uses of Genomic Technology by the Military 
A. Biobanks and Geno-Phenobanks 
The major current use of genomic technology by the military is 
collecting DNA from present and former members of the military in 
order to facilitate the identification of remains. The collection, called 
a biobank or biorepository, is the Armed Services Repository of 
Specimen Samples for the Identification of Remains (AFRSSIR), 
which was established in 1993. Every member of the military is 
required to submit a blood sample to the repository upon enlistment, 
and as of 2012, over 6.5 million blood samples have been collected and 
stored on bloodstain cards similar to those used for newborn 
screening.9 Under current policy, AFRSSIR can retain the samples for 
up to 50 years.10 Aside from being used to identify remains, DNA 
collected by the military can be decoded or sequenced, and the results 
linked to medical and personnel information obtained from service 
members or extracted from existing records. This results in the 
creation of a “geno–phenobank,” which enables genetic and genomic 
variations to be correlated with medical, physical, and other 
characteristics and was one of the recommendations in the JASON 
report. Several military geno–phenobanks are under construction. In 
 
glossary/index.cfm?id=532 (last visited May 2, 2014). The remainder of 
this paper uses the terms interchangeably unless the discussion requires 
that either genetic or genomic technologies be addressed specifically. 
8. The JASON report also notes that “it may be beneficial to know the 
genetic identities of an adversary and, conversely, to prevent an 
adversary from accessing the genetic identities of U.S. military 
personnel.” JASON Report, supra note 1, at 1. The report does not 
elaborate, but the authors arguably have in mind the use of genetic 
information in the development of weaponry. Although the ethical, 
legal, and policy issues raised by the prospect of genetic weaponry are 
beyond the scope of this paper, the paper considers the need to keep 
genomic information about our own personnel from being used as a 
weapon by adversaries as a factor in its analysis. 
9. Donna Miles, DNA Registry Unlocks Key to Fallen Servicemembers’ 
Identities, U.S. ARMY (Jan. 25, 2007), http://www.army.mil/article/ 
1508/DNA Registry Unlocks Key to Fallen Servicemembers 039 
Identities/. 
10. Mayfield v. Dalton, 109 F.3d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir.1997). 
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2009, in collaboration with the National Institute of Mental Health, 
the U.S. Army began a $65 million, 6-year “Army Study to Assess 
Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers” (STARRS) to identify risk 
factors for military suicides. One component of the research, the New 
Soldier Study which started in February, 2011, asks new enlistees to 
volunteer to complete surveys and to undergo neurological and DNA 
testing to identify genetic and other risk factors.11 As of November, 
2012, 34,851 blood samples have been obtained.12 In 2012, the U.S. 
Air Force Office of the Surgeon General established the “Patient-
Centered Precision Care Research (PC2-Z) Program,” which collects 
and sequences DNA from saliva samples provided by volunteers from 
the Air Force Medical Service and matches the results with their 
medical information and family history.13 The purpose of the project 
is to create a “personalized medicine profile” that identifies genomic 
risks for “clinically actionable, common complex diseases that are 
traditionally treated in the primary care setting,” and to determine 
the impact of this information on the health of the volunteers.14 
Finally, in 2011, the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) 
established the Million Veteran Program, a geno–phenobank that 
collects DNA and health information from veterans and combines it 
with their VA medical records for research purposes. As of March 
2014, over 240,000 veterans have enrolled.15  
In the future, the military may want to use the AFRSSIR DNA 
samples for research purposes rather than just for the identification of 
remains. The results of DNA sequencing could be combined with 
medical and personnel records for present and former members of the 
military to form a very large geno–phenobank. Aside from ELSI 
concerns discussed below, such an effort may be limited by the degree 
to which past records have been converted to an electronic format, 
which would be necessary in order to facilitate the research project. 
 
11. Army STARRS New Soldier Study (NSS): The First Days of Service, 
NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/ 
suicide-prevention/suicide-prevention-studies/army-starrs-new- soldier-
study-nss-the-first-days-of-service.shtml (last visited May 2, 2014). 
12. ARMY STARRS, ARMY STARRS BY THE NUMBERS: QUARTER 4, 2013, 
available at http://www.armystarrs.org/sites/default /files/ 
By%20the%20numbers%20Web%2020130Q4%20.pdf.  
13. Christopher E. Bradburne et al., Implementing Genome-Informed 
Personalized Medicine in the U.S. Air Force Medical Service via the 
Patient-Centered Precision Care Research (PC2-Z) Program, 31 JOHNS 
HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST 4, 333 (2013), http://techdigest. 
jhuapl.edu/TD/td3104/31 04-Bradburne.pdf (accessed May 2, 2014). 
14. Id. at 337. 
15. AKESOgen and the VA Million Veteran Program to Collaborate on 
Geno- typing 105,000 Veterans, U.S. DEP’T VET. AFF. (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://www.research.va.gov/MVP/media.cfm. 
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B. Genomic Testing 
As noted earlier, the JASON report calls for DoD to create geno–
phenobanks to “determine which phenotypes that might reasonably 
be expected to have a genetic component have special relevance to 
military performance and medical cost containment.” Once these 
genetic and genomic components are identified, genetic tests can be 
developed to identify which individuals possess genotypes that contain 
these components. 
Currently, the U.S. military tests enlistees for sickle cell anemia 
and Glucose 6-phosphate dehydrogenase deficiency.16 As the field of 
personalized genomic medicine expands, military physicians can be 
expected to use newly developed genomic tests in the same ways as 
their civilian medical colleagues, namely, to identify individual 
genomic characteristics associated with the prevention, diagnosis, and 
treatment of disease. For example, genetic testing can identify 
individuals with genetic disorders that will not become symptomatic 
until some point in the future, such as Alzheimer’s or Huntington’s 
disease. In some cases, there may be steps that can be taken to 
prevent or mitigate the symptoms. Genomic testing also may be able 
to make or to help confirm a clinical diagnosis; the Air Force, for 
example, is reported to be developing a genetic test for colorblindness 
that improves upon existing detection methods.17 As the JASON 
report recognized, military physicians also increasingly will practice 
pharmacogenomics, in which genomic tests help determine the 
appropriate drugs to prescribe for specific patients based on their 
genomic profiles.18 Like their civilian counterparts, moreover, military 
physicians might use genomic testing to identify individuals who were 
at risk for genetic disorders such as breast and colorectal cancers that 
can be prevented or mitigated by early detection and intervention. 
Military interest in genomic testing will extend beyond the 
prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of disease. The JASON report 
anticipates that tests will identify individuals who have genetic 
profiles that are of “special relevance to military performance and 
medical cost containment.” Depending on whether test results 
revealed that individuals possessed desirable or undesirable genomes, 
the military could consider the results in deciding whether to 
incentivize or block enlistment, or to advance or curtail military 
careers, and the test results also could be useful in making duty, 
 
16. Susannah Baruch & Kathy Hudson, Civilian and Military Genetics: 
Nondiscrimination Policy in a Post-GINA World, 83 AM. J. HUM. 
GENET. 435, 439 (2008). 
17. Genevolve to Launch Military Grade DNA Test for Color Blindness, 
PRWEB (May 4, 2012),  http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/5/ 
prweb9471028.htm. 
18. JASON Report, supra note 1, at 43. 
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specialization, and geographic assignments. The National Cancer 
Institute, for instance, describes a young woman found to carry a 
mutation in a gene that increases the risk of breast cancer who may 
not be considered eligible for deployment for a 12to 15-month period 
because access to recommended health care, such as MRI screening, 
may not be easily accessible.19 In 2010, a former military physician 
described an officer with a family history of Huntington’s disease who 
was tested to see if he had inherited the disease gene before being 
promoted to flag rank, and a female pilot who was grounded after she 
developed a deep vein thrombosis and genetic testing revealed that 
she had a genetic mutation called Factor V Leiden polymorphism that 
increases the risk of such life-threatening blood clots.20  
The military will be interested in identifying individuals with 
genomic variations of general medical interest, but also mutations 
that affect physical attributes that are of particular significance in 
military operations. The JASON report, for example, mentions the 
value of genetic testing for susceptibility to traumatic bone fracture, 
prolonged bleeding, or slow wound healing.21 In 2009, a group of 
researchers published an updated human gene map for “performance 
and health-related fitness phenotypes” containing over 214 entries 
that may be of interest to the military.22 The JASON report also 
describes future genetic testing that would provide information about 
“the ability to tolerate conditions of sleep deprivation, dehydration, or 
prolonged exposure to heat, cold, or high altitude.”23  
Researchers already have developed and marketed a genetic test 
that identifies one variant of the ACTN3 gene in humans, called 
R577X, which codes for a protein called α-actinin-3. Individuals with 
this genetic variation tend to have an abundance of slowtwitch 
muscles, which are associated with activities such as long-distance 
running that require endurance, while individuals who do not have 
this variant of the ACTN3 gene have more fast-twitch muscles, which 
are associated with activities requiring shorter bursts of energy such 
as sprinting and weightlifting. Recruiters and training and assigning 
 
19. Cancer Genetics Risk Assessment and Counseling, NAT’L CANCER INST., 
http://www.cancer.gov/ cancertopics/pdq/genetics/risk-assessment-and-
counseling/HealthProfessional/page6 (last visited May 2, 2014). 
20. Genetics and Public Policy Center, Genetics Perspectives on Policy 
Seminar—Genes in Uniform: Don’t Test, Don’t Tell, GENETICS & PUB. 
POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 10, 2006), http://www.dnapolicy.org/ 
news.past.php?action=detail&past event id=25. 
21. JASON Report, supra note 1, at 43. 
22. Molly S. Bray et al., The Human Gene Map for Performance and 
Health-related Fitness Phenotypes: The 2006–2007 Update, 41 Med. Sci. 
Sports Exercise 35 (2009). 
23. JASON Report, supra note 1, at 43. 
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officers might be interested in knowing which of these variations their 
potential enlistees or trainees possessed. 
Genomic testing for mental as well as physical traits will attract 
the military’s attention. A considerable amount of research on genetic 
variants associated with mental illness already is underway. For 
example, geneticists are searching for mutations that predispose 
warfighters to or protect them from post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) and have identified several genes, such as FKBP5, PACAP, 
TLL1, rs263232 in ADCY8, and rs71534169 in DPP6, as susceptibility 
genes for PTSD.24 Researchers also are seeking genomic mutations 
that are associated with superior mental abilities, and although claims 
of success are often met with skepticism, many geneticists are 
confident that genomic tests for superior mental capabilities 
eventually will be developed. Scientists at the University of 
Pennsylvania, for example, have created a strain of “smart” mice that 
produce more of a protein called NR2B, giving them superior memory 
and learning abilities.25 Studies in humans have identified a gene 
called dysbindin on chromosome 6 and another called SNAP-25 on 
chromosome 20 that are associated with cognitive ability.26 Genetic 
researchers have demonstrated in mice that a genetic mutation of the 
eIF2α gene and genetic manipulation of the Lynx1 gene could achieve 
enhancements in synaptic plasticity, learning, and memory.27 Studies 
funded by the NIH found that people with a certain variant of the 
gene catecholamine-O-methyltransferase can improve both memory 
 
24. See, e.g., Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Risk Prediction, 
Meeting Summary, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH (Nov. 2, 2011), 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-funding/scientific-meetings/2011/ 
ost-traumatic-stress-disorder-ptsd-risk-prediction/index.shtml; Marilyn 
C. Connelly et al., Genetics of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Review 
and Recommendations for Genome-Wide Association Studies, 12 CURR. 
PSYCHIATRY REP. 313 (2012); Alicia Chang, Military Experiment Seeks 
to Predict PTSD, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 20, 2009), 
http://www.usnews.  com/science/articles/2009/11/20/military-
experiment-seeks-to-predict-ptsd 
25. Ya-Ping Tang et al., Genetic Enhancement of Learning and Memory in 
Mice, 401 NATURE 63 (1999). 
26. Katherine E. Burdick et al., Genetic Variation in DTNBP1 Influences 
General Cognitive Ability, 15 HUM. MOLECULAR GENET. 1563 (2006); M. 
F. Gosso et al., Common Variants Underlying Cognitive Ability: Further 
Evidence for Association between the SNAP-25 Gene and Cognition 
Using a Family-Based Study in Two Independent Dutch Cohorts,7 
GENES, BRAIN BEHAV. 355 (2008). 
27. Mauro Costa-Mattioli et al., eIF2alpha Phosphorylation Bidirectionally 
Regulates the Switch from Short- to Long-Term Synaptic Plasticity and 
Memory, 129 CELL 195 (2007); Julie M. Miwa & Andreas Walz, 
Enhancement in Motor Learning through Genetic Manipulation of the 
Lynx1 gene, PLOS ONE (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.plosone.org/ 
article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0043302. 
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and problem solving by taking a drug called tolcapone, which is 
prescribed for patients with Parkinson’s disease, and exogenous 
medication may overcome a type of genotype-associated trait under 
which genetic variation can be associated with reduced dopamine 
neurotransmission to impair learning and cognitive performance.28 
Finally, a Chinese research institute located in Hong Kong has 
purchased more than $90 million worth of advanced genetic 
sequencing machines and is using them, among other things, to 
sequence the DNA of 2000 Chinese school children to search for genes 
that correlate with educational testing scores.29 Again, recruiters and 
trainers can be expected to want to use tests such as these in 
recruitment, training, and assignment.  
C. Gene-Based Therapeutics 
Like their civilian colleagues, military physicians will develop and 
employ genomic technology not only to diagnose and predict but to 
prevent and treat both genomic and non-genomic diseases. A detailed 
description of the prospects for gene-based preventive measures and 
treatments is beyond the scope of this paper, but they include (1) the 
use of techniques such as recombinant DNA to manufacture drugs; (2) 
gene therapy, or the introduction or modification of endogenous or 
exogenous human DNA to provide an increased ability to combat 
injury or illness (for example, Jonathan Moreno cites the interest of 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in using genetic 
manipulation to improve the immune system30) or to correct or 
compensate for genomic abnormalities; and (3) altering the 
composition or characteristics of the microbiome, the non-human 
organisms found in the human digestive system and elsewhere that 
play a significant role in metabolism and human health. An especially 
controversial subject is germ line therapy, which entails making 
therapeutic alterations in an individual’s DNA at such an early stage 
of development that the changes will be incorporated into eggs or 
sperm and therefore can be inherited by the individual’s descendants. 
The military may be interested in germ line therapy, for example, in 
order to reduce the frequency and costs of care for heritable genomic 
disorders in military families. 
 
28. José A. Apud et al., Tolcapone Improves Cognition and Cortical 
Information Processing in Normal Human Subjects, 32 
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1011 (2007); Kristin M. Pearson-Fuhrhop 
et al., Genetic Varia- tion in the Human Brain Dopamine System 
Influences Motor Learning and Its Modulation by L-Dopa,       8 PLOS 
ONE e61197 (2013), http://www.plosone.org/article/ 
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0061197. 
29. JASON Report, supra note 1, at 21. 
30. JONATHAN MORENO, UNDUE RISK: SECRET STATE EXPERIMENTS ON 
HUMANS 291 (2001). 
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D. Genomic Enhancements 
The military will be intensely interested in exploiting the 
association between genomics and human capabilities and 
performance. In 2001, the Committee on Opportunities in 
Biotechnology for Future Army Applications of the Board on Army 
Science and Technology at the National Research Council called on 
the Army to “lead the way in laying ground-work for the open, 
disciplined use of genomic data to enhance soldiers” health and 
improve their performance on the battlefield.”31 A 2002 report by DoD 
Information Assurance and Analysis Center observed that “because 
genomics [sic] information offers clues to improving human 
performance it could provide the Army with means of increasing 
combat effectiveness.”32 The JASON report notes that “both offensive 
and defensive military operations may be impacted by the 
applications of personal genomics technologies through enhancement 
of the . . . readiness, and performance of military personnel.”33  
One way that genomic science can improve military effectiveness 
has been mentioned earlier: using genomic testing to sort individuals 
based on how they were expected to function in various military 
environments. In addition, the same genomic modification techniques 
described in the previous section on gene-based therapeutics could be 
used to actively improve warfighting ability. For example, until 
recently, one company, 23andMe, offered direct-to-consumer genetic 
testing for a number of nondisease traits including avoidance of errors, 
eating behavior, food preference, measures of intelligence, memory, 
muscle performance, and pain sensitivity. The company acknowledged 
that the ability of the tests to actually measure these traits has not 
been established, but if the genomic variations could in fact be 
identified, it might be possible to manipulate them directly or by 
administering drugs that affected the proteins for which they coded. 
Conceivably, then, warfighters could be made smarter and less error-
prone, given better memories and muscles, or have their metabolisms 
altered to enable them to function with fewer calories or on unusual 
diets. 
More fancifully, perhaps, warfighters could be genomically 
reengineered to need less sleep. A study published in February 2013 
and financed by the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research 
 
31. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, OPPORTUNITIES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR FUTURE 
ARMY APPLICATIONS 64 (2001). 
32. Ashley R. Melson, Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Biotechnology in the 
Military: A Comparative Analysis of Legal and Ethical Issues in the 
Research, Development, and Use of Biotechnological Products on 
American and British Soldiers, 14 ALB. L. J. SCI. TECH. 497, 506 n.41 
(2004). 
33. JASON Report, supra note 1, at 1. 
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reported that sleep deprivation disrupted the functioning of over 700 
genes.34 In the future, these genes might be able to be reprogrammed 
so that they were not as affected by sleeplessness, enabling 
warfighters to carry out missions despite lack of sleep. A 2008 JASON 
report predicted that, in contrast to elite sports, small improvements 
in warfighter performance would not have a dramatic effect on the 
outcome of military engagements; a major breakthrough in the need 
for sleep, however, “could seriously alter the balance of 
engagement.”35  
III. Limitations on the Use of Civilian Approaches in 
the Military 
The uses of genomic technology by the military described in the 
previous section raise a host of ELSI issues. How should the military, 
for example, conduct genomic research? What types of genomic 
testing are appropriate in the military and how should the results be 
used? What rules should govern how the military provides genomic 
therapeutics and enhancement technologies to its personnel? 
Similar questions arise in the civilian sector, and the ELSI 
program at the NIH has attempted to articulate solutions. However, 
the suitability of these civilian solutions in the military is limited by 
differences in core values. In his landmark work Moral Issues in 
Military Decision Making, Anthony Hartle articulates freedom, 
equality, individualism, and democracy as the core American values.36 
For the military on the other hand, Hartle identifies “honor”, “duty”, 
and “country”.37 In contrast to the civilian notion that the welfare of 
the individual is paramount, in the military it is subservient to the 
unit, mission, and country. In contrast to the civilian values of 
freedom, equality, and democracy, members of the military are 
obliged to obey lawful orders. The military also emphasizes taking 
responsibility for one’s decisions and actions, and an obligation to 
promote the welfare of subordinates to the extent consistent with the 
welfare of the unit, the accomplishment of the mission, and the 
safeguarding of the state. 
In a separate paper,38 I argue that these differences in core values 
require a different set of principles to govern bioethics in the military. 
 
34. Id. 
35. JASON PROJECT, HUMAN PERFORMANCE 76 (Mar. 2008), 
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/human.pdf. 
36. ANTHONY E. HARTLE, MORAL ISSUES IN MILITARY DECISION MAKING 
136–141, 173 (2004). 
37. Id. at 57–60. 
38. Maxwell J. Mehlman & Stephanie O. Corley, A Framework for Military 
Bioethics, 13 J. MIL. ETHICS 331 (2014). 
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The focus on the welfare of the individual patient in the clinical 
application of the civilian principle of beneficence, which stands in 
sharp contrast to the military value of selflessness, should be replaced 
in the military by the principle of proportionality. According to the 
principle of proportionality, a biomedical risk can be imposed on a 
warfighter only when there is no less risky alternative to accomplish a 
legitimate military objective, and the nature and degree of the risk are 
outweighed by the military advantage sought to be gained. In view of 
the lack of individual autonomy in the military, it also makes sense to 
downplay the civilian emphasis on voluntary choice reflected in the 
principle of “respect for persons” by substituting instead the principle 
of paternalism. Combining the principles of paternalism and 
proportionality, military commanders have a duty to ensure that the 
biomedical risks that they impose on their subordinates are 
proportionate. These twin principles also guide privacy and 
confidentiality: commanders have a duty to protect their 
subordinates” privacy and confidentiality unless and to the extent 
that it is outweighed by military necessity. Commanders likewise have 
a duty to protect warfighters” dignity by avoiding exposing them to 
biomedical risks that humiliate or demean them. Finally, the principle 
of fairness should replace the civilian principle of justice and require 
members of the military to give their consent when commanders 
impose a biomedical risk only on a subgroup of subordinates or when 
the risk is especially great. Fairness also precludes using biomedical 
risks as a punishment for bad behavior or imposing the risks in a 
discriminatory manner or on warfighters who are less able to bear 
them than others, such as physically weaker members of a unit. 
Not only do basic principles of bioethics differ in civilian and 
military life, but several laws that play an important role in civilian 
genomics do not apply to service members, including the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)39 and, according to the so-
called Feres doctrine, the common law doctrine that provides damages 
for victims of medical malpractice.40 These legal differences must be 
taken into account in analyzing the ELSI issues that arise in military 
genomics. 
 
39. See, e.g., Genetic Discrimination, NAT’L HUM. GENETIC RES. INST., 
http://www.genome.gov/ 10002077 (last visited May 2, 2014); Kathy L. 
Hudson et al., Keeping Pace with the Times—The Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2661 (2008); 
Susannah Baruch & Kathy Hudson, Civilian and Military Genetics: 
Nondiscrimination Policy in a Post-GINA World, 83 AM. J. HUM. 
GENET. 435 (2008). 
40. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Lanus v. U.S., 133 
S. Ct. 2731 (2013); Major v. United States, 835 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988); Connell v. Copeland, 417 Fed. 
Appx. 3 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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The sections that follow identify the ELSI challenges raised by 
military genomics explain how similar issues have been addressed by 
the civilian ELSI program, and consider whether the civilian 
approaches are appropriate in the military due to their different 
bioethical and legal frameworks, and, if not, how these approaches 
should be adjusted to meet the needs of the military in an ethically, 
legally, and socially appropriate manner. The challenges can be 
grouped into several broad categories. One set of concerns pertains to 
military human subjects research.41 A related set of issues involve the 
military operation of DNA biobanks and geno–phenobanks and the 
commercialization of research discoveries. A third series of issues 
relates to clinical and enhancement uses of genomic technologies by 
the military.42  
IV. Research Issues 
Military research with human subjects can be conducted in three 
settings. One is intramural research, where the subjects are members 
of the military. The second is extramural research, where the military 
sponsors research that is conducted in civilian institutions such as 
hospitals and universities.43 The third setting is research conducted by 
the VA on veterans who are receiving medical care from the VA. 
Each of these settings raises different ESLP issues and therefore will 
be discussed separately. 
A. Intramural Clinical Research 
As discussed earlier, the military may wish to conduct genomic 
research to obtain general information relating to human health or to 
obtain information of particular relevance to the military. There are 
two types of genomic research involving human subjects: clinical 
research, in which experiments are conducted on live humans, and 
non-clinical research, which is conducted on human biological material 
such as DNA samples. (DoD calls clinical research “research involving 
a human being as an experimental subject” to distinguish it from 
“research involving human subjects,” which includes both clinical and 
 
41. Issues are also raised by experiments on non-human subjects, especially 
other primates, but are beyond the scope of this paper. 
42. As noted in an earlier footnote, military genomics also potentially 
involves the development of genomic weaponry, a topic that is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
43. A study also might be conducted on both military and civilian subjects, 
which will not be discussed specifically because the issues that it raises 
are addressed by the discussion of the separate use of these study 
populations. 
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non-clinical research.44) The following discussion concerns clinical 
genomic research; a discussion of non-clinical genomic research 
appears in Balancing Risks and Benefits below. 
1. Informed Consent 
It might be thought that, under the principles of proportionality 
and paternalism, clinical research can take place without the informed 
consent of military subjects when the research is important enough to 
the unit, mission, or nation. An argument can be made that one 
major philosophical justification for informed consent, Immanuel 
Kant’s deontological “categorical imperative” that individuals should 
be treated as ends rather than as means, has little application in the 
military. Military bioethicist Michael Gross asserts that, at least in 
wartime, “human life is of but instrumental value”, and observes that 
“Kant’s maxim to treat others as ends guides bioethics. But it does 
not guide war. During armed conflict, there is very little compunction 
about using persons as means.”45 No doubt based in part on this 
reasoning, the military gave soldiers lysergic acid diethylamide and 
other hallucinogens without telling them that they were being given 
the drugs46 but instead that they were participating in a study on the 
effectiveness of protective clothing and equipment against chemical 
warfare agents.47 Similarly, voluntary consent was not always obtained 
from military personnel involved in radiation experiments that were 
conducted as part of atomic bomb testing.48  
Despite doubts about the applicability of a Kantian perspective to 
the military, at least since the trials of Nazi war criminals and the 
promulgation of the Nuremberg Code, which makes no distinction 
between civilian and military subjects, it is generally accepted that 
competent adults must give their informed consent to serve as 
subjects in biomedical research, and this consensus has long been 
 
44. Protection of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in 
DoD-Supported Research, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 
No. 3216.02, Glossary at 38 (2011) [hereinafter DoDI. 3216.02], available 
at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/321602p.pdf (accessed 
May 2, 2014). 
45. MICHAEL GROSS, BIOETHICS AND ARMED CONFLICT: MORAL DILEMMAS OF 
MEDICINE AND WAR 171–72 (2006). Gross’s emphasis on wartime 
suggests that warfighters should not be regarded as means to the 
military’s ends in peacetime or in non-combat operations, but the 
principle of proportionality applies in all phases of military life, and 
therefore individual welfare always can be sacrificed for military 
necessity so long as the sacrifice is proportionate. 
46. H. R. REP. NO. 106–556, at 111, 185 (2010) [hereinafter Radiation 
Report]. 
47. U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671 (1987). 
48. Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 484. 
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reflected in official military policy.49 Moreover, if the risks to subjects 
are more than minimal, it is required under the military bioethical 
principle of fairness since only a subset of the force is likely to be 
enrolled as participants. Informed consent also has practical value in 
military research; failure to obtain informed consent could discourage 
individuals from serving as research subjects, thereby reducing the 
amount of beneficial research that can be conducted, and even could 
discourage individuals from serving in the military in the first place. 
A 2000 congressional report on the DoD’s mandatory anthrax vaccine 
program, for example, was especially concerned about the effect of the 
program on retention in reserve units, and noted that half of the air 
crew in one Air National Guard unit had resigned as a result.50  
There is no reason to waive or weaken the requirement of 
informed consent for biomedical research employing military personnel 
as subjects when the research involves genomic science. Informed 
consent is a central focus in the government’s efforts to protect 
human subjects in genetic and genomic research.51 Indeed, it has been 
 
49. Troops in Cuba who participated in Walter Reed’s yellow fever 
experiments signed forms indicating that they understood the risk and 
freely consented to be enrolled as subjects. Radiation Report, supra note 
44, at 97; Arthur O. Anderson, A Brief History of Military 
Contributions to Ethical Standards for Research Involving Human 
Subjects, ARTNSCIENCE, http://artnscience.us/Med Ethics/index.html 
(last visited May 4, 2014) [hereinafter Anderson History]. In 1953, the 
Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, distributed a memorandum 
throughout the military that permitted Armed Services personnel to 
serve as research subjects only if they gave their voluntary consent. 
Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 105; Anderson History, at 11. 
Although the Wilson Memorandum was classified top secret until 1975 
for reasons that are not entirely clear (see Radiation Report, supra note 
44, at 107), the Army chief of staff issued a non-classified version of the 
memorandum in 1954 as Army Directive CS:35 (see Radiation Report, 
supra note 44, at 107) and incorporated CS:35 into Army regulations as 
AR 70–25 in 1962. Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 182; Anderson 
History at 11, 16. The Air Force issued the Wilson Memorandum as a 
regulation in 1965, and the Navy included a requirement of voluntary 
research consent in its Medical Department Manual in 1967. Radiation 
Report, supra note 44, at 183. In addition, the Navy made it clear in 
1969 that the requirement of voluntary consent applied both to patients 
and healthy subjects, and the Army followed suit in 1973 in Army 
Regulation 40–38. Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 183. In 1984, 
Congress enacted legislation prohibiting DoD from conducting human 
subjects research without informed consent (10 U.S.C. § 980). (As 
discussed below, however, the Secretary of Defense may waive the 
requirement of informed consent in certain circumstances.) DoD also has 
issued Directive 3216.2, which, among other things, states that informed 
consent is a requirement of DoD policy. 
50. Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 46. 
51. See, e.g., Informed Consent for Genomics Research, NAT’L HUM. 
GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/27026588 (last visited May 
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argued that genomic research requires even stronger protections for 
subjects than many other types of human experimentation because of 
the sensitive nature of personal genomic information that a study may 
uncover, such as predictive data about future illnesses for which the 
subject or the subject’ family members are at risk52 or misattributed 
paternity and maternity, that is, the discovery that a person’s 
presumed father or mother is not in fact biologically related.53  
One reason to conduct genomic research on military personnel 
without informed consent might be to help preserve secrecy so that 
adversaries were not alerted to the production of information that 
might help them construct genomic weapons or defenses.54 For 
example, the military may feel the need to conceal the fact that it is 
obtaining genomic information about members of the same 
genomically differentiated subpopulation as enemy combatants.55 
National security arguments have been put forth on behalf of military 
experiments conducted without consent in the past, such as atomic 
radiation experiments during the Manhattan Project and the Cold 
War. Although critics of those experiments argue that a measure of 
voluntary consent could have been sought from subjects, for example, 
by using the term “dangerous radioactive substance” in place of the 
classified word “plutonium”,56 it may not always be possible to use 
obfuscating terminology and still provide sufficient information to 
 
2, 2014); ELSI Research Priorities and Possible Research Topics, NAT’L 
HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/27543732 (last 
visited May 2, 2014). 
52. Protecting Human Research Subjects, National Institutes of Health 
Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) 1993 Institutional 
Review Board Guidebook, NAT’L HUM .GENOME RES. INST., 
http://www.genome.gov/10001752 (last visited May 2, 2014) 
53. Jean McEwen, Genetic Information, Ethics, and Information Relating to 
Biological Parenthood, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND 
POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 356 (Thomas H. Murray & Maxwell 
J. Mehlman eds., 2000). 
54. Another reason to permit human subjects research to proceed without 
informed consent is to facilitate research on emergency treatments for 
patients who cannot give consent because of their condition and where 
there is no time to obtain legally authorized consent from someone else, 
such as a family member. Congress in 2001 enacted a provision 
permitting this type of emergency research to be conducted on 
warfighters. 10 USC § 980(b). In 2006, Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) adopted a regulation permitting emergency research to be 
conducted outside of the military as well. 21 CFR § 50.24. 
55. Victor W. Sidel & Barry S. Levy, Physician-Soldier: A Moral Dilemma? 
in 1 TEXTBOOKS OF MILITARY MEDICINE: MILITARY MEDICAL ETHICS 
(Edmund D. Pelegrino, Anthony E. Hartle, Edmund G. Howe & Walter 
Reed eds., 2004), at 293–312. 
56. Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 205–207. 
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subjects to enable them to give informed consent. The solution would 
seem to be to enroll only those subjects who held security clearances 
high enough to permit them to be given the classified information. 
A requirement that members of the military give their informed 
consent to serve as subjects in genomic research does not mean that 
they actually can do so, however. In order for individuals to give 
informed consent, they first must have adequate information about 
the nature, potential benefits, and risks of the experiment, and they 
must be able to understand the information to a reasonable degree.57 
Serious doubts have been expressed about prospective subjects” 
ability to comprehend and absorb the information they are given.58 
There is little reason to expect members of the military to do better 
than other subjects; on average, for example, they are less well 
educated than the general public.59  
Members of the military may also feel pressured to consent. 
Indeed, a strong argument can be made that warfighters should be 
regarded as a “vulnerable” study population, despite not being 
formally listed as vulnerable in the Common Rule.60 It was not until 
1981 that Army regulations were changed to prohibit penalties under 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice from being imposed on 
warfighters who refused to volunteer or withdrew from participating 
in military research.61 Even without the prospect of formal 
punishment, warfighters may feel that they have no choice but to 
acquiesce when they are invited to serve as subjects. As Victor Sidel 
and Barry Levy explain in the Textbook of Military Medicine, 
“because they cannot simply “quit their jobs” “file a grievance” with a 
union, government agency, or professional organization, military 
personnel may not believe that they can truly refuse to participate in 
these experiments. They may feel more like a “captive audience” than 
like “volunteers.”62 Moreover, as the House Committee on 
Government Reform pointed out in its critique of DoD’s mandatory 
anthrax vaccination program, “in a culture based on a chain of 
command and the power to compel, attempts at persuasion and 
education often devolve into intimidation.”63 Superiors may make  
57. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
58. See James Flory & Ezekiel Emanuel, Interventions to Improve Research 
Participants’ Understanding in Informed Consent for Research, 292 
JAMA 1593 (2004). 
59. Efthimios Parasidis, Justice and Beneficence in Military Medicine and 
Research, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 723, 765–66 (2012). 
60. Id. at 775; John McManus et al., Informed Consent and Ethical issues 
in Military Medical Research, 12 ACAD. EMER. MED. 1120 (2005). 
61. Anderson, supra note 47. 
62. Sidel & Levy, supra note 53, at 297. 
63. Radiation Report, supra note 44, at 46. 
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subordinates’ willingness to serve as subjects a condition for allowing 
them to undertake certain attractive missions, for example, missions 
to test exciting new technologies such as genomic enhancements.64 
Unit cohesion and comradeship may lead warfighters to agree to be 
subjects if other members of their unit already have.65 Warfighters 
may also feel that it is their patriotic duty to participate in research,66 
a notion that some commentators are pushing in the civilian sector.67  
DoD is well aware of the risk that warfighters asked to give their 
informed consent to serve as research subjects will feel that they have 
no choice but to accede. DoD rules prohibit superiors from 
“influencing” the decisions of their subordinates regarding 
participation as subjects and specifically forbid superiors from being 
present when informed consent is being sought.68 Moreover, except for 
a payment of $50 in return for having blood withdrawn, military 
personnel on duty may not be compensated for serving as subjects.69  
Warfighter’s limited autonomy requires a shift in emphasis in 
military clinical research away from the reliance on informed consent 
as a primary protection for subjects in the civilian model and toward 
a reliance on paternalism. Civilian research ethics contain a strong 
element of paternalism; subjects are only asked to give their consent 
to participate in research after experts, in the form of institutional 
review boards, sponsors, government regulators, and the investigators 
themselves, are satisfied that the potential benefits of a study 
outweigh the risks. Given the limits on warfighter autonomy, the need 
for paternalism in the military is more pronounced, however, and 
ensuring proportionality must be viewed as the primary responsibility 
of research directors, institutional review boards, and subjects’ 
commanders rather than the subjects themselves. To that end, DoD 
rules require the appointment of an “ombudsman” and a “research 
 
64. See Jennifer Siegel, Advancing Ethical Research Practices in the 
Military, 24 ABA HEALTH SECTION, THE HEALTH LAWYER 1 (2012). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. See G. Owen Schaefer, Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Alan Wertheimer, The 
Obligation to Participate in Biomedical Research, 302 JAMA 67 (2009). 
Warfighter’s rights are also limited by the Feres doctrine, which 
prohibits warfighters from suing the military for damages for medical 
malpractice, including when they have been harmed by researcher 
negligence. The staff of the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs in 
1994 therefore recommended that the doctrine be deemed inapplicable if 
military personnel are injured in experiments in which they were forced 
to serve as subjects. U.S. SENATE CMTE. ON VET. AFF., IS MILITARY 
RESEARCH HAZARDOUS TO VETERANS’ HEALTH? LESSONS SPANNING HALF 
A CENTURY 44 (1994). 
68. DoDI 3216.02, supra note 42, at §§ 7(e)(1)(b) and (c). 
69. Id. at § 11(a)(1)(a). 
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monitor” (who may be the same person) to oversee the informed 
consent process when the research presents more than minimal risk 
(and, in the case of an ombudsman, when the recruitment of subjects 
takes place in a “group setting”).70 Individual services have added 
additional oversight in certain cases in the form of a requirement for a 
second level of protocol review in addition to review by an 
institutional review board (IRB).71 One approach that the military has 
taken to promote voluntary participation in research is to establish 
special units from which to draw subjects, beginning with Operation 
Whitecoat, in which 2,300 Seventh-Day Adventist Church 
conscientious objectors between 1954 and 1973 participated in 137 
protocols to develop vaccines and treatments for Q fever, tuleremia, 
various viral encephalitides, Rift Valley fever virus, sand fly fever and 
plague,72 and continuing with the Medical Research Volunteer 
Subjects program using the US Army Medical Research Institute of 
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) troops recruited from “Medic School 
91B” at Fort Sam Houston, Texas.73 Although concerns have been 
voiced in connection with Operation Whitecoat that Seventh-Day 
Adventist church officials endorsed the program, with one subject 
later pointing out that “we grew up to trust the church,”74 the head of 
USAMRIID emphasizes that participation in research among 
members of these units is voluntary, with only about eighty percent of 
the troops consenting to serve as subjects in any one year.75 This has 
led some commentators to suggest that similar units should be the 
 
70. Id. at §§ 7(e)(1)(d), 8(a). 
71. The Army requires second-level review by the Human Research 
Protection Office, a part of the Office of Re- search Protections, US 
Army Medical Command Medical Research and Materiel Command. 
U.S. Army Reg- ulation 40–38 (1989) and 70–25 (1990). The Navy 
requires second-level review by the Director, Defense Research and 
Engineering, for clinical studies and the Secretary of the Navy must 
review research involving “severe or unusual intrusions, either physical 
or psychological, on human subjects” including “consciousness- altering 
drugs or mind-control techniques,” (p. 9) and research on ‘potentially or 
inherently controversial topics (such as those likely to attract significant 
media coverage or that might involve challenge by interest groups).’ 
SECNAVINST 3900.39D (2006). The Air Force Surgeon General’s 
Research Oversight Commit- tee reviews protocols involving greater 
than minimal risk and investigational drugs, etc. AFI40–402, § 2.2.2 
(2005). 
72. Anderson, supra note 47. 
73. Id. 
74. Mark D. Somerson, Church Blessed Germ Experiments; Army’s 
Biological Warfare Research Used Seventh-Day Adventist Volunteers, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 8, 2001, at 1A. 
75. Id. 
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primary if not the exclusive source of military research subjects.76 But 
it is still unclear if the members of these units would feel sufficiently 
free to decline to participate in research, and specialized groups of 
subjects may not be representative of the troops who actually would 
be exposed to the instrumentalities being tested. 
2. Balancing Risks and Benefits 
An axiom of research ethics is that a study may proceed only if 
the risks are outweighed by the potential benefits. In balancing 
research risks and benefits, civilian and military principles of bioethics 
function almost identically. In both regimes, the risks to the subjects 
can be outweighed either by the benefits to the subjects themselves or 
by the benefits, in the form of the knowledge gained, to others. 
Civilian research thus employs an approach similar to the military 
principle of proportionality in which the welfare of the individual can 
be subordinated to a greater good in appropriate circumstances. 
Civilian research also embraces the military principle of paternalism; 
as mentioned earlier, the balancing of risks and benefits is entrusted 
first to institutional review boards, study sponsors, government 
regulators, and the investigators themselves, and only after they have 
satisfied themselves that the benefits outweigh the risks are subjects 
asked to make their own assessment in giving their informed consent 
to participate. 
Balancing research risks and benefits in the military raises certain 
questions, however. Warfighters may be subjected to grave personal 
risks in order to achieve a military objective; as Bill Rhodes, president 
of the International Society for Military Ethics, states, “a military 
member is expected to serve the state unto maiming, capture, or 
death.”77 Accordingly, a research risk that would be deemed excessive 
for civilian subjects, such as a significant likelihood of serious harm in 
a study intended to produce knowledge to benefit others but with no 
direct benefit to the subjects, might be deemed acceptable for military 
subjects, under the principle of proportionality if the military 
objectives were sufficiently important. In other words, while the risks 
might be greater than for civilians, so might be the corresponding 
benefits to the unit, mission, or country.78 Along this line, military 
 
76. Parasidis, supra note 57, at 778. 
77. BILL RHODES, AN INTRODUCTION TO MILITARY ETHICS 50–51 (2009). 
78. Military research rules incorporate the civilian concept of ‘no more than 
minimal risk’, which relaxes certain human subjects’ protections in 
certain civilian studies. However, the meaning of the concept in the 
military is unclear. DoD regulations use the same definition of ‘minimal 
risk’ as civilian regulations (no more than those risks ‘ordinarily 
encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical 
or psychological examinations or tests’) (32 CFR § 219.102(i)); and DoD 
Instruction 3216.02 states that ‘the phrase “ordinarily encountered in 
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subjects ought to be allowed to participate in studies intended to 
produce information of special relevance to the military, such as tests 
of genomic interventions to treat PTSD, that posed greater risks than 
studies aimed at developing genomic interventions of no special value 
to the military. 
Another question is how to weigh the risks and benefits of 
research on genomic enhancements, such as interventions to increase 
“the ability to tolerate conditions of sleep deprivation, dehydration, or 
prolonged exposure to heat, cold, or high altitude” mentioned in the 
JASON report.79 Although as discussed later, the distinction between 
enhancements and other types of biomedical interventions is not 
always easy to make,80 some commentators believe that enhancement 
benefits are less worthwhile than medical benefits and therefore that a 
risk that might be acceptable in a medical trial would be unethical in 
an enhancement experiment. One bioethicist states, for example, that: 
[t]he cost/benefit analysis is different for enhancement. While 
those who are experimenting with treatments for serious 
diseases may only succeed in substituting one kind of misery for 
another, those experimenting on human enhancement are likely 
to substitute a miserable life for a happy one.81  
As my colleague Jessica Berg and I have argued, however, the 
value of a benefit clearly depends on the nature of the benefit;82 an 
enhancement that potentially increased cognitive function 
 
daily life or during the performance of routine physical or physiological 
examinations or tests” in the definition of minimal risk . . . shall not be 
interpreted to include the inherent risks certain categories of human 
subjects face in their everyday life. For example, the risks imposed in 
research involving human sub- jects focused on a special population 
should not be evaluated against the inherent risks encountered in their 
work environment (e.g., emergency responder, pilot, soldier in a combat 
zone) or having a medical condition (e.g., frequent medical tests or 
constant pain)’ [DoD Instruction 3216.02, Encl. 3(6)(b)(emphasis 
added)]. This language suggests that the risks of ordinary daily life for 
warfighters should be deemed the same as those for civilians. On the 
other hand, the DoD Instruction could be interpreted to mean that, 
while ordinary daily risks for warfighters are understood to be greater 
than for civilians, “minimal risk” should not be evaluated in terms of 
warfighters in especially dangerous units or locations, such as combat. 
Clarification of the DoD Instruction would be helpful. 
79. JASON, supra note 1, at 43. 
80. See text accompanying notes 180–182, infra. 
81. NICHOLAS AGAR, LIBERAL EUGENICS: IN DEFENCE OF HUMAN 
ENHANCEMENT 167–68 (2004). 
82. Jessica Berg & Maxwell Mehlman, Human Subjects Protections in 
Biomedical Enhancement Research: Assessing Risk and Benefit and 
Obtaining Informed Consent, 36 J. L. MED. ETHICS 546 (2008). 
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substantially, for example, might be deemed more valuable than a 
treatment, say, for nail fungus. In both health-oriented and 
enhancement research, therefore, the potential benefit necessary to 
justify a set of risks will depend on the specifics of the study in 
question. Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish between enhancement 
and other types of biomedical research in the military; a study of a 
genomic intervention to provide combat troops with better-than-
normal vision, hearing, or cognition, or a greater-than-normal ability 
to tolerate conditions of sleep deprivation, dehydration, or prolonged 
exposure to heat, cold, or high altitude, for example, could be 
regarded as the study of how to prevent injury as well as an 
enhancement study. In short, there is no reason to treat an 
enhancement experiment differently than a treatment study when it 
comes to balancing risks and benefits. 
3. Return of Research Results 
A particularly controversial topic in genomic research is whether 
researchers have a duty to provide study findings to the subjects if 
the information could provide health benefits to the subjects. The 
issue arises especially when researchers are examining large amounts 
of genomic information on large numbers of subjects, such as 
searching a collection of DNA samples for variations associated with 
particular disease risks or traits. As noted earlier, for example, 
military researchers are hunting for genomic variations that 
predispose warfighters to PTSD. If they discover such variations, 
should they inform those subjects who have them? 
The answer might seem to be “of course”, since individuals 
generally have a right to receive their personal biomedical 
information. But some geneticists worry that, since genomic 
information is often difficult to understand, subjects may misinterpret 
it and be harmed. Genomic findings often are probabilistic, and the 
average person has difficulty understanding probabilities. The effect of 
a genomic variation may be small; the genetic variation APOE4, for 
example, is found in forty percent of persons with late-onset 
Alzheimer’s disease but also in twenty-five to thirty percent of the 
general population.83 Many disease genes vary greatly in how they are 
“expressed” and in their degree of “penetrance”, so that individuals 
may never show symptoms or may only experience a mild form of the 
illness. Since physicians may be uncertain about how to interpret 
genomic test results, one suggestion is to rely on specially trained 
experts called genetic counselors to convey results to subjects, but this 
requires more time and adds to the cost. Another complication is that 
 
83. Alzheimer’s Disease Fact Sheet, NAT’L INST. ON AGING, 
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some diseases such as Alzheimer’s cannot now be prevented or 
treated, and some commentators question the value of informing 
subjects about risks for those kinds of disorders.84 Furthermore, the 
Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act (CLIA) requires laboratories 
that test DNA to be “CLIA-certified” if the results are reported to 
diagnose, prevent, or treat disease or to assess health,85 and obtaining 
and maintaining CLIA certification is burdensome and expensive. 
Finally, commentators argue that researchers do not have the same 
obligations to subjects that physicians have to their patients, in 
particular, a duty to look after the subjects’ health needs.86  
Some of these objections do not apply in the military as much as 
they do in civilian research. The military is responsible for service 
members’ health, so military researchers, like other superiors, have an 
obligation to look out for the well-being of their subordinates under 
the principle of paternalism. Moreover, military laboratories are not 
driven by the same profit motive as private civilian laboratories, and 
therefore may be less burdened by having to comply with CLIA 
requirements. 
But military researchers still need to carefully consider the pros 
and cons of returning results to subject. They should have the same 
compunctions about how well subjects understand study results as 
their civilian brethren, especially since they are held accountable for 
the welfare of subjects under the principle of paternalism. 
Furthermore, there may be special considerations that justify 
withholding genomic information from military subjects. For example, 
if the military eventually discovers genomic variations closely 
associated with certain desirable or undesirable traits, it may decide 
to test prospective enlistees and use the results in making service 
assignments, but may not want to disclose the results to warfighters 
because of military exigencies. Warfighters told that they were at 
increased risk for certain types of battlefield injuries, for example, 
they might lose effectiveness if military necessity required them to 
participate in combat missions. The need for security to keep sensitive 
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Alzheimer’s Disease, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 298 (2009). 
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genomic information out of the hands of adversaries also might justify 
withholding test results from warfighters in certain circumstances. 
Another question is whether researchers who disclose results to 
patients to improve their health should also disclose the results to 
family members who may also be at risk for the same genomic 
conditions, and if so, should they do so only with the subjects’ 
permission. The question has been addressed mainly in the context of 
the relationship between patients and physicians rather than subjects 
and researchers, and there is a split of opinion. Many prominent 
groups say that doctors may override the patient’s wishes if the 
physician has made a reasonable effort to obtain the patient’s 
consent, there is a high probability that imminent, serious harm will 
occur if the information is not disclosed, and only information 
necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of disease is disclosed.87 (The 
Institute of Medicine goes further and says that the information must 
be disclosed.88) However, some physician groups maintain that 
notifying family members is the patient’s responsibility rather than 
the physician’s, and point out that laws in Illinois, Massachusetts, 
and New York prohibit any disclosure of genetic information without 
the patient’s consent.89 Whatever the eventual consensus, the only 
reason for the rules governing disclosure of research to family 
members to differ between military and civilian life would be if the 
disclosure would pose a significant threat to national security or the 
successful completion of a military mission.  
87. See, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL 
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 
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Information, 62 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 474 (1998), available at 
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GENETICS PROGRAMME (2003), http://www.who.int/ genomics/ 
publications/en/ethicalissuesinmedgenetics%20report.pdf (last visited 
May 5, 2014). 
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SOCIAL POLICY (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994). 
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4. Incidental and Unintended Findings 
A topic that is closely related to the return of research results is 
how researchers should handle information about subjects that is 
outside of the scope of the study, called “incidental” or “unintended” 
findings.90 (A similar issue arises when a physician examining a 
patient’s genome for certain clinically relevant information discovers 
other medically relevant findings.91) Researchers searching for genomic 
mutations that made subjects susceptible to PTSD, for example, 
inadvertently might discover mutations that placed certain subjects at 
risk for other diseases. The question is whether the researchers should 
disclose the incidental information. Again, the answer might seem 
clear that they should, since doing so could alert subjects to the need 
for future vigilance and beneficial medical care. But this raises 
concerns similar to those raised by returning results in general. Is the 
medical risk reflected by the incidental information sufficiently 
important to outweigh the chance that subjects will misunderstand it? 
How clear is it that the individual will show symptoms of the genomic 
disease or will experience a serious form of the illness? What if little 
or nothing can be done to reduce or eliminate the health risk? One 
particularly troublesome type of unintended finding, which can occur 
when both parents and offspring are studied in “pedigree” research, is 
that a parent is not biologically related to a child; how should 
researchers handle this result, which can be extremely disruptive to 
the family unit? 
For these reasons, some commentators maintain that researchers 
have no obligation to inform subjects about incidental findings.92 A 
growing consensus seems to be emerging, however, that researchers 
should disclose incidental findings that are sufficiently important for 
the subjects’ health, or at least that subjects should be asked during 
the informed consent process if they wish to receive this information.93 
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There is no reason to assume that military researchers have a lesser 
obligation regarding disclosure of incidental findings than civilian 
researchers. In fact, an argument can be made that military 
researchers have a greater obligation than their civilian counterparts 
to consider returning incidental findings to subjects because military 
personnel have less ability than civilians to obtain genomic testing 
outside of the military. 
5. Follow-Up with Subjects 
Another research controversy concerns whether researchers have a 
duty to contact subjects after a study is over to ascertain whether 
they are suffering any long-term or latent adverse effects, and to alert 
them to new information bearing on their health, such as the 
discovery of genomic risks that were not known at the time of the 
study or the availability of new treatments or preventive measures. 
The military has been criticized, for example, for not adequately 
following up with subjects in the “man-break” experiments on 
mustard gas during World War II.94 Civilian researchers object that 
they should not have a long-term obligation to follow up with subjects 
because of the difficulties of keeping track of their whereabouts, but 
military researchers should be better able to keep track of military 
subjects, who may still be in the military or receiving care from the 
VA. In addition, the Army maintains a Volunteer Registry for all 
subjects in more-thanminimal-risk studies, one of the purposes of 
which is to enable the military to “exercise its obligation to ensure 
research volunteers are adequately warned of new risks and to provide 
new information as it becomes available,”95 and the US Army Medical 
Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC) stores the 
information for a minimum of 75 years. In sum, the military should 
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endeavor to contact subjects about future developments of 
significance to their health.  
6. Paying for Participation in Research 
Bioethicists are concerned that offering people substantial 
amounts of money or other items of economic value in return for 
serving as research subjects could compromise the voluntariness of 
informed consent,96 but this is less of a concern in the military because 
DoD rules forbid paying research subjects on active duty except for 
drawing a blood sample, for which they may receive $50.97 (Off-duty 
personnel may receive compensation comparable to civilian subjects,98 
which under Health and Human Services (HHS) rules must be 
approved by an IRB and be a reasonable amount in accordance with 
prevailing local rates.99) Military IRBs must be on guard however 
against offering troops non-monetary benefits for enrolling in research 
studies, such as desirable assignments or commendations. DoD rules 
prohibit superiors “from influencing the decisions of their subordinates 
. . . regarding participation as subjects”,100 but the rules could be more 
specific by defining what counts as “influence”. Moreover, the 
prohibition against paying military subjects emphasizes the need to 
protect them from being exploited by being pressured to participate in 
disproportionately risky research. 
Another financial issue that arises in civilian biomedical research 
is whether subjects are entitled to a portion of the financial benefits 
that accrue to sponsors of studies that lead to the commercialization 
of a lucrative new medical product. Although withholding 
compensation has been criticized as unfair, there is a general 
consensus that sponsors can avoid compensating subjects if they 
disclose their policy to subjects during the informed consent process.101 
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The argument for rewarding military subjects is weakened by their 
obligation to serve the national interest, but the issue is complicated 
by the fact that a substantial amount of the fruits of military research 
often redounds to the benefit of private enterprises that commercialize 
the resulting discoveries, including prostheses102 and thermal imaging 
devices.103 A solution might be for DoD to ensure that genomic 
discoveries with important medical value derived from research on 
military subjects were available to current and former members of the 
military through military medical services and the VA. 
7. Compensating Subjects for Experimental Injury 
The Common Rule governing human subjects research does not 
require researchers to compensate civilian subjects for injuries 
sustained as a result of their participation,104 but subjects who have 
been injured by negligent investigators may recover monetary 
damages in a tort action. For example, the father of an 18-year-old 
subject who died in a University of Pennsylvania experiment aimed at 
developing a gene therapy for a genetic disease called ornithine 
transcarbamylase sued the investigators for negligently enrolling his 
son without proper safety testing. (The case was eventually settled for 
an undisclosed sum.105) No such remedy is available to military 
subjects, however, as a result of the so-called Feres doctrine.106 DoD 
rules require researchers “to establish procedures to protect human 
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subjects from medical expenses (not otherwise reimbursed)” that 
directly result from participation in more-than-minimal-risk military 
research, whereas civilian subjects may receive compensation for losses 
such as pain and suffering and reduced future earnings.107  
The application of the Feres doctrine in military research has 
been criticized.108 It also runs counter to the principle of paternalism 
insofar as it shields the military from having to fully redress 
superiors” mistakes. But Congress has not seen fit to modify the 
doctrine to permit injured subjects to receive compensation, the 
courts have consistently given the doctrine a broad interpretation on 
the premise that immunity from suit is essential to maintain military 
discipline, and even some of the critics only want soldiers to be able 
to sue for intentional rather than merely negligent research 
misconduct.109  
8. Privacy and Confidentiality 
Protecting the privacy and the confidentiality of subjects” 
personal health information has long been a priority in civilian 
research, and its importance has been reinforced by the adoption of 
the privacy and security provisions of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and its accompanying 
regulations. One of the requirements of informed consent under the 
Common Rule, for example, is giving potential subjects “a statement 
describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality of records 
identifying the subject will be maintained,”110 and the government 
recently has proposed strengthening data security and information 
protection requirements for federally sponsored research.111 In 
addition, the GINA specifies that genetic information is protected 
under HIPAA.112  
As noted earlier, DoD has adopted the Common Rule/It also has 
subjected itself to HIPAA.113 However, the privacy and confidentiality 
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of members of the military is subordinate to military necessity. 
Michael Gross observes, for example, that “among one’s own soldiers, 
the scope of the private sphere decreases and that of the public 
expands as collective welfare takes precedence over an individual’s 
private good.”114 DoD rules accordingly permit commanders to obtain 
health information “to assure the proper execution of the military 
mission”,115 and while service members have the right to an 
accounting of disclosures, there is no such right for disclosures for 
national security or intelligence purposes.116  
One of the chief reasons for protecting privacy and confidentiality 
in regard to genomic information is to prevent stigma and 
discrimination. The legal protections against workplace discrimination 
for civilian federal employees in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and 
GINA do not apply to uniformed members of the military.117 Once 
warfighters leave the military, however, they come under GINA’s 
protections against employment discrimination on the basis of 
genomic information. Furthermore, DoD policies implementing the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 changed a previous policy 
that had denied health and disability benefits to service members who 
experienced injuries or illnesses during their time of service if the 
condition was “congenital or hereditary.”118 Now, service members are 
entitled to compensation and benefits so long as they do not have a 
disability that was noted at the time of enlistment, unless there is 
“compelling evidence or medical judgment” that the disability existed 
prior to enlistment.119 However, United States Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC) found that the two strongest fears 
among service members with respect to behavioral health treatment, 
including PTSD, were confidentiality, fear of being labeled, and 
negative impact on career.120 As shown in Part I.B., the most recent 
 
114. Gross, supra note 43, at 121. 
115. DODR 6025.18-R, supra note 111, at § C7.11.1.1. 
116. DODR 6025.18-R, supra note 111, at § C13.1.1.5. 
117. Rehabilitation Act/GINA: Confidentiality of Medi- cal/Genetic 
Information, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPP. COMM’N (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2012/ginaconfidentialityofmedica
lgeneticinformation2.html; Susannah Baruch & Kathy Hudson, Civilian 
and Military Genetics: Nondiscrimination Policy in a Post-GINA 
World, 83 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 435 (2008). It is not clear, however, at 
what point enlistees lose the protection of GINA. 
118. Disability Evaluation System, DoD Directive 1332.38 (Aug. 5, 2014), § 
E.3.P.4.5.2.2. 
119. Hereditary and/or Genetic Diseases, Revised DoD Instruction 
E3.P4.5.2.2 (2008). 
120. Lt. Col. Paul Dean& Lt. Col. Jeffrey McNeil, Breaking the Stigma of 
Behavioral Healthcare, 25 SPECIAL WARFARE 6 (2012). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Issues in the Use of Genomic Technology by the U.S. Military  
145 
research has shown a genetic contribution to PTSD and some scholars 
have raised concerns regarding “the display of pertinent genetic 
information . . . may also generate stigma and affect individual career 
outcomes.”121  
How should the status of subjects as members of the military 
affect the privacy and confidentiality of identifiable genomic 
information obtained in the course of military human subjects 
research? One approach might be that, given the reduced privacy and 
confidentiality within the military, the military should be able to use 
identifiable genomic information obtained in the course of conducting 
human subjects research on military subjects without the subjects” 
informed consent, so long as the information is used for a legitimate 
military purpose. But this approach conflicts with the spirit of the 
military’s policy of requiring military subjects to give their informed 
consent to serve as research subjects. Another approach would be for 
IRBs to give the potential loss of privacy and confidentiality less 
weight when balancing risks and benefits in research on military 
subjects than in research on civilians. But the federal government is 
contemplating removing privacy and confidentiality concerns 
altogether as matters for IRB review and instead imposing mandatory 
data security rules on all human subjects research.122 The best 
approach therefore is to rely on the principles of proportionality and 
paternalism described earlier and place the responsibility on 
commanders, including those overseeing research programs and the 
researchers themselves, to protect subordinates against inappropriate 
disclosures of identifiable genomic information. 
In summary, using members of the military as subjects raises 
many of the same ethical issues as employing civilian subjects, but 
there are several notable differences. Due to limitations on warfighter 
autonomy, members of the military need special protection from 
coercion and undue influence during the informed consent process, 
and the principles of proportionality and paternalism require 
commanders to assure themselves that the potential benefits of the 
study outweigh the risks rather than relying on individual subjects to 
make this judgement for themselves in uncertain cases. At the same 
time, risks that would be excessive for civilian subjects might be 
acceptable in the military if the military’s need for the research were 
sufficiently compelling. Finally, the fact that the military is 
responsible for the health of its members and the relative ease with 
which it can keep track of warfighters, including after they are 
discharged, argue in favor of imposing a clearer obligation on military 
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researchers than on civilian researchers to follow up with subjects and 
to return results and incidental and unintended findings to them in 
appropriate cases. 
B. Extramural Clinical Research 
DoD spends approximately seventy-five percent of its outlay for 
research and development on extramural research, that is, research 
conducted at civilian institutions.123 The allocation of such a large 
portion of the defense R&D budget to civilian researchers results from 
the need to fund industrial contractors that develop weapon systems 
and the desire to nourish a broad science base at U.S. academic 
institutions. Some of this DoD sponsored research—there are no 
published estimates of how much–involves the use of live human 
subjects. Some of these studies may involve genomic science, and the 
amount of genomic human subjects research can be expected to 
increase if DoD follows the recommendations in the JASON report 
described earlier. 
Extramural studies of human subjects must be approved by IRBs 
at the civilian institutions conducting the research as well as by 
internal military IRBs. The Army requires an additional layer of 
protocol review by the USAMRMC Commanding General’s Human 
Subjects Research Review Board for studies involving “gene 
transfer”.124  
Although commentators have noted the potential for conflict 
between internal military and external civilian IRBs,125 there is no 
information on how they interact, for example, how they resolve 
disagreements. Nor is there an understanding of how the members of 
civilian IRBs decide whether to approve protocols for military 
sponsored research. They may not be clear on how to weigh risks to 
subjects against military necessity and national security. On the one 
hand, they may feel that it is inappropriate for them to reject military 
studies that pose risks to subjects that would be unacceptable in 
purely civilian research. On the other hand, some IRB members may 
be critical of military research for various reasons, leading them to 
block or unreasonably delay studies that should go forward. In 
addition, both DoD and HHS regulations forbid IRBs from 
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considering “possible long-range effects of applying knowledge gained 
in the research (for example, the possible effects of the research on 
public policy) as among those research risks that fall within the 
purview of its responsibility,”126 and IRBs may not know how this 
restriction should affect their consideration of the long-range effects of 
military research. 
A special set of problems arises with classified extramural military 
research. Bioethicist Jonathan Moreno notes the difficulties raised by 
conducting classified military research outside of the military, 
including requiring IRB members and potential subjects to have 
security clearances.127 (DoD rules, for example, require IRBs to 
determine if potential subjects “need access to classified information 
to make a valid, informed consent decision.”128) The Advisory 
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments evaluated human 
subjects protections in classified government research and identified a 
number of shortcomings in written informed consent forms.129 
Academics describe resistance among academics and universities to 
conducting classified government research due to concerns about 
infringement of academic freedoms, including the freedom to publish 
research results.130 Nineteen of thirty-nine universities she studied had 
policies prohibiting either classified or non-publishable research. 
(Eisenberg notes, however, that in some cases faculty researchers at 
these institutions may be affiliated with off-campus laboratories that 
do not have similar restrictions.) In addition, Eisenberg reports that a 
number of other universities do not consider classified research for 
purposes of promotion, tenure, or academic credit. 
DoD has adopted special protections for subjects in classified 
experiments regardless of whether the subjects are military personnel 
or civilians: the protocol must be approved by the Secretary of 
Defense; the fact that the study is sponsored by DoD and that the 
research is classified must be disclosed as part of the informed consent 
process, unless the Secretary of Defense makes an exception because 
“providing this information could compromise intelligence sources or 
 
126. 32 CFR § 219.11(a)(2); 45 CFR § 46.111(a)(2). 
127. Jonathan D. Moreno, Bioethics and the National Security State, 32 J. L. 
MED. ETHICS 198 (2004). 
128. DoDI 3216.02, supra note 42, at § 13(d)(4) (2011). 
129. Nancy E. Kass & Jeremy Sugarman, Are Research Subjects Adequately 
Protected? A Review and Discussion of Studies Conducted by the 
Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments,6 KENNEDY 
INST. ETHICS J. 271 (1996). 
130. Maxwell Gregg Bloche, Review Essay: Rogue Science: Science in the 
Service of Human Rights. By Richard Pierre Claude, 91 GEO. L. J. 1257, 
1274 (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Research and Academic 
Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1988). 
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methods;” IRBs must do a full rather than “expedited” review; and an 
IRB member who disagrees with a majority decision approving the 
study may appeal to the Secretary.131132,  
The foregoing concerns about extramural military research raise 
the question of whether and in what circumstances it should take 
place at all. An argument can be made that all military human 
subjects research, including genomic research, should take place 
intramurally using members of the military as subjects. By being in 
the military, they have agreed to subordinate their interests to those 
of the military, and therefore seem more appropriate to bear research 
risks than civilians, especially in experiments that offer no prospect of 
direct benefit to subjects. Furthermore, military subjects are 
protected by the principle of paternalism and therefore, at least in 
theory, commanders who expose them to disproportionate 
experimental risks are accountable and subject to punishment. In 
civilian bioethics, on the other hand, there is a dispute over how 
much of a duty civilian researchers owe to protect the interests of 
their subjects, with some commentators asserting that the 
investigators” duty to subjects is superseded by their duty to the 
study sponsor.133 On the other hand, certain types of genomic studies 
may be more difficult to conduct in a military environment. For 
example, genome-wide association studies may need to use large 
civilian DNA repositories in order to have the power to discover 
variations that account in small ways for phenotypes of military 
interest. Moreover, the importance of maintaining the quality of U.S. 
science argues in favor of continuing to use military research funding 
to support civilian research institutions. Finally, requiring military 
research to be conducted on military personnel could lead to public 
perceptions that they were being used as human guinea pigs, 
especially if the research was not on a topic primarily of military 
interest. 
C. VA Clinical Research 
The VA has already staked a claim to genomic research by 
launching its Million Veteran Program in May, 2011, which collects 
voluntary donations of DNA from veterans along with permission to 
correlate their genetic data with information in their medical and 
 
131. DoDI 3216.02, supra note 42, at § 13. 
132. In addition, in classified extramural research, at least one member of the 
IRB must be a non-federal employee. DoDI 3216.02, supra note 42, at § 
13 (d)(2). 
133. See, e.g., E. Haavi Morreim, Medical Research Litigation and 
Malpractice Tort Doctrines: Courts on a Learning Curve, 4 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. POL’Y 1, 41–46 (2003). 
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personnel records in order to establish a geno–phenobank.134 (The 
program is described further below in the section on biobanks.) In 
addition, the VA conducts genomic research on amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis, bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, and PTSD.135 In 2006, it 
established a Genomic Medicine Program Advisory Committee to 
guide the start of a new Genomic Medicine Program, and it also 
conducts pharmacogenomic research.136 (All VA research is 
intramural.137) 
The VA, like DoD, has adopted the Common Rule to govern live 
human subjects research.138 However, VA patients asked to participate 
as subjects, like other civilian patients, may fear that they will be 
denied health care if they refuse. VA researchers are required to make 
“every reasonable effort” to provide patients with an informational 
brochure called “Volunteering in Research—Here Are Some Things 
You Need To Know” which states that they have a right to say “no” 
and that refusing to participate “will not affect your VA health care 
or benefits.”139 Beyond that, the agency has no special human 
subjects” protections. For example, it does not recognize veterans as a 
vulnerable research population. While it is true that they are not 
among the groups formally designated as vulnerable subjects, they 
resemble those groups in their dependence on government-provided 
health care, and the fact that they served in the military may make 
them feel that they have a duty to participate in research whenever 
they are asked. These considerations require the VA to employ a 
heightened degree of paternalism to protect veterans against 
disproportionate research risks. 
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D. Geno-Phenobanks 
While the foregoing sections discuss the ethical, legal, and policy 
issues raised by clinical genomic research using human subjects, this 
section discusses another type of genomic research that uses DNA 
samples rather than living human subjects. 
As noted earlier, the military currently possesses millions of DNA 
samples from current and former service members, and the Army, Air 
Force, and VA are collecting additional samples for research purposes. 
The resulting biorepositories can be linked to the medical and 
personnel records of the individuals who contribute the DNA to create 
geno–phenobanks, enabling researchers to discover links between DNA 
variants and physical and mental conditions and characteristics. 
Geno–phenobank research raises many of the same types of 
ethical, legal, and policy concerns as clinical research, including the 
need to obtain consent from DNA contributors to use their DNA for 
research, return of results and incidental findings, shared benefit, and 
maintaining the privacy and confidentiality of research results. In 
regard to consent, some commentators have suggested that, based on 
traditional research ethics, individuals whose DNA is proposed to be 
used for research should be re-contacted and asked to give consent for 
each new research project.140 Other commentators propose that, at the 
time that their DNA is obtained, individuals should give “multi-
layered” consent which would enable them to specify their wishes on a 
detailed form, such as giving consent to future research on specific 
diseases or being re-contacted and asked to consent to any future 
research.141 However, under increasing recognition that recontacting 
participants to obtain their specific informed consent for every future 
research project may be impractical, expensive, and possibly impede 
socially valuable research,142 there has been a growing movement away 
from the model of specific informed consent. Alternatives that have 
been put forward include (1) permitting human research ethics 
committees to waive individual consent under circumstances where 
obtaining consent is impracticable and there is a strong public interest 
in the research;143 (2) “broad” consent that allows samples to be used 
for one or more general purposes, such as biomedical research in 
 
140. See, e.g., Bernice S. Elger & Arthur L. Caplan, Consent and 
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general, or research on one or more specific diseases144; and (3) 
“blanket” consent that allows for unrestricted use of samples.145  
To understand the issues involving consent, it is important to 
distinguish between research on existing DNA samples and research 
on newly acquired samples. Suppose DoD wanted to combine existing 
DNA samples in the AFRSSIR with digitalized medical and personnel 
records of service members in order to conduct biomedical research. 
Would DoD have to obtain the consent of the DNA contributors, and 
if so, what kind of consent? 
On the one hand, it might be argued that consent is unnecessary. 
The DoD policy that requires informed consent from military research 
subjects only applies to “research involving a human being as an 
experimental subject,” which DoD defines as involving “an 
intervention or interaction with a living individual,”146 and therefore 
the policy does not apply to research on ex vivo DNA samples. 
Moreover, providing DNA to the AFRSSIR is mandatory; warfighters 
have been court-martialed for refusing,147 and their courts-martial 
have been upheld by the courts.148 Furthermore, having to obtain 
consent could be burdensome in the case of individuals who are no 
longer in the service, who might be difficult to locate. The argument 
for proceeding without consent is especially strong in regard to 
research with distinct military applications, for example, on gene 
variants associated with coolness under fire, or genomic therapies that 
speed trauma recovery. 
On the other hand, the consensus in the civilian sector is that 
research on DNA samples requires the consent of the contributors if 
their identity is revealed or can be determined from the data, which, 
as mentioned earlier, would be the case with a military geno–
phenobank.149 Furthermore, the mandatory nature of the AFRRSSIR 
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program has been criticized,150 and in any event, DoD currently 
permits AFRRSSIR samples to be used for purposes other than 
identification of remains only with the consent of the donor or the 
surviving primary next-of-kin.151 Finally, the whereabouts of personnel 
who have left the service may not be that difficult to determine since 
they may be obtaining health care from the Veterans Administration. 
If the consent of warfighters to use existing DNA samples is 
necessary, what kind of consent must be obtained? Specifically, can 
warfighters be asked to consent to any research use of their DNA 
(referred to as “broad” or “general” consent), or must they give 
specific consent for each particular research project, including for 
different projects undertaken in the future? This is the subject of 
controversy in the civilian sector, but there appears to be a growing 
consensus, reinforced by changes in consent rules proposed by 
DHHS,152 that broad consent is acceptable, and the reasoning 
supporting the consensus suggests that broad consent also should be 
sufficient for military research. 
If the military must obtain consent for research using existing 
DNA, all the more reason that it should obtain consent for research 
on newly acquired specimens, since this can be done easily when the 
specimen is obtained. Again, the consent could be broad. Indeed, this 
is the approach followed by current military genomic research 
projects.153 Additional issues arise in connection with the use of DNA 
 
when stripped of traditional identifiers, has, at least in some sense, the 
potential to re-identify the individual from whom it was obtained.”). 
150. Steven C. Hendricks, A Fourth Amendment Privacy Analysis of the 
Department of Defense’s DNA Repository for the Identification of 
Human Remains: The Law of Fingerprints Can Show Us the Way, 181 
MIL. L. REV. 69 (2004); Patricia A. Ham, Army of Suspects: The History 
and Constitutionality of the U.S. Military’s DNA Repository and Its 
Access for Law Enforcement Purposes, 2003 ARMY L. 1 (2003); Kelly S. 
Erbes, Identification of the Unknown Soldier and the Fight for the Right 
to Anonymity: The Human Genome Project and Implications of a 
National DNA Database, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 443 (1999); Elizabeth 
Reiter, The Department of Defense DNA Repository: Practical Analysis 
of the Government’s Interest and the Potential for Genetic 
Discrimination, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 975 (1999); Sarah Gill, The Military’s 
DNA Registry: An Analysis of Current Law and a Proposal for 
Safeguards, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 175 (1997); Robert Craig Scherer, 
Mandatory Genetic Dogtags and the Fourth Amendment: The Need for 
a New Post-Skinner Test, 85 GEO. L. J. 2007 (1997). 
151. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Operations, DoD Instruction 
5154.30, § E2.5.4.4 (Mar. 18, 2003) at E2.5. 
152. HHS, ANPRM, supra note 109. 
153. ARMY STARRS, http://www.armystarrs.org (last visited May 5, 2014); 
Informed Consent Session—U.S. Air Force Medical Service PC2-Z 
Study, CORIELL PERSONALIZED MED. COLLAB., http://www.cpmc. 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Issues in the Use of Genomic Technology by the U.S. Military  
153 
samples from deceased individuals. The Common Rule that governs 
civilian research does not apply to deceased persons, who are not 
deemed to be “human subjects.”154 However, some commentators have 
argued that researchers should honor preferences that a deceased 
person made known while alive,155 and that consent should be 
obtained from the next-of-kin.156 In the case of the military, when they 
submit samples to AFRSSIR, enlistees could be asked to give their 
consent to posthumous research using their DNA. 
As noted earlier, the VA operates the Million Veteran Program, a 
geno–phenobank that collects DNA and health information from 
veterans and combines it with their VA medical records for research 
purposes. Veterans at participating VA medical centers are sent a 
letter asking if they would like to participate. If they opt in, they fill 
out a brief health survey and make an appointment at the medical 
center to accompany their next medical visit.157 During this visit, they 
are counseled about the program, given the opportunity to consent to 
be placed in the database and to make their medical records available 
for research, and asked to give a blood sample. The consent is broad, 
as the veteran is asked to consent to a general program of genetic 
research, and the sample is kept indefinitely. As of October, 2012, 
over 100,000 veterans had enrolled.158 As noted earlier, the VA does 
not return any results to the donors, claiming that it is barred from 
doing so because the DNA is not analyzed at a CLIA-certified 
laboratory. Given the public nature of VA funding and the relative 
ease in locating participating veterans, an argument can be made that 
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the cost concerns raised by requiring samples to be analyzed at CLIA-
certified laboratories are outweighed by the potential health benefits 
of returning results that are medically significant. 
V. Genomic Testing 
Testing in aid of medical diagnosis or treatment raises ethical and 
legal concerns. Whether physicians can order HIV tests and drug 
screens without patient consent has been especially contentious, but 
objections also have been made to the widespread physician practice 
of ordering other “routine” medical tests without informing patients 
of the nature of the tests and obtaining their consent.159  
When the testing in question is genomic, special concerns arise 
because the testing laboratory obtains access to the patient’s DNA, 
which contains the patient’s entire genetic code rather than just 
information about the targeted illness. One issue that has been 
discussed earlier, for example, is whether the physician has a duty to 
inform the patient about “incidental” findings relevant to the 
patient’s health. 
When addressing ethical and legal concerns of genomic testing, it 
is common to distinguish between predictive genomic testing, which 
aims to ascertain if a person is at risk for a genomic illness in the 
future, and non-predictive testing, that is, testing to diagnose or aid 
in treating a manifested illness. As discussed earlier, military 
physicians can be expected to employ genomic testing for non-
predictive purposes in the same manner as their civilian colleagues, 
that is, to help diagnose and treat illness in their military patients. 
Non-predictive genomic testing generally has been less controversial, 
since it tends to be viewed as analogous to other types of medical 
testing. For example, a provision in Massachusetts state law 
prohibiting genetic testing without informed consent excludes “any 
test for the purpose of diagnosing or detecting an existing disease, 
illness, impairment or disorder” from its definition of “genetic test.”160 
But even when it is performed for non-predictive purposes, genomic 
testing can yield information about the patient’s risks for future 
illnesses, which can lead to social stigma if it becomes known to 
others and discrimination if it gets into the hands of employers or 
health insurers. From an ethical and legal standpoint, then, there is 
no meaningful difference between predictive and non-predictive 
genomic testing, and in the civilian sector, there is a clear consensus 
 
159. See, e.g., Clarence H. Braddock III et al., Informed Decision Making in 
Outpatient Practice, 282 JAMA 2313 (1999); Clarence H. Braddock III 
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that no genomic testing should be performed without an individual’s 
informed consent.161  
As discussed previously, however, the bioethical principles that 
govern military life are different from those that apply to civilians. 
The health status of warfighters not only affects their well-being, but 
the well-being of the unit, the success of the mission, and the security 
of the state. Unlike civilians, therefore, warfighters are not free to 
refuse necessary medical care, including medical testing.162 Should the 
fact that a test is genomic change this rule, that is, should warfighters 
be able to refuse a genomic test, and should the answer be the same 
when the genomic test is predictive rather than in aid of diagnosis or 
treatment? Finally, should warfighters be able to refuse genomic 
testing that pertains to non-disease characteristics, such as physical 
and mental abilities? 
Despite the special concerns raised by genomic testing, a strong 
argument can be made that it should be subject to the same rules as 
other types of military medical testing, meaning that warfighters 
cannot refuse to submit to genomic testing, including when it is 
predictive rather than in aid of treatment and diagnosis. As noted 
earlier, providing a blood sample for DNA testing under AFRRSSIR 
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is mandatory, and its mandatory nature has been upheld by the 
courts. Furthermore, the Military Rules of Evidence governing 
proceedings under the Uniform Military Code of Justice provide that, 
while communications between a patient and psychotherapist—
arguably the most sensitive type of medical information—are 
privileged, the privilege does not apply when the information is 
“necessary to ensure the safety and security of military personnel . . . 
or the accomplishment of a military mission.”163 Moreover, although 
the military in a sense is an employer of its personnel, it is not subject 
to the prohibition in GINA against requiring employees to undergo 
genomic testing. In any event, there is some sentiment that GINA 
should be amended to allow employers to use genomic testing that 
could identify job applicants who might pose a threat to the safety of 
others as a result of their genomic endowment.164  
At the same time, however, military genomic testing is subject to 
the principles of proportionality and paternalism that govern military 
bioethics generally, so it may only be undertaken if accountable 
superiors determine that the risks, including loss of privacy and 
potential breaches of confidentiality, are outweighed by military 
necessity. This is especially important in the case of genomic testing 
for non-disease characteristics. The military has a legitimate interest 
in obtaining information about warfighters” physical and mental 
abilities, including genomic information, but only if the genomic test 
is a valid indicator of what it purports to show and the information is 
necessary in order to carry out the mission. Furthermore, as noted 
earlier, the military has adopted the privacy rules of HIPAA, 
including the limitation on disclosure of protected health information 
to the minimum necessary to accomplish the purpose of the 
disclosure,165 and the requirement that the information must be kept 
secure. 
Finally, the military must be mindful of relying too heavily on the 
results of genomic tests that have not been adequately validated. The 
popular press is quick to tout purported links between genomic factors 
and traits or conditions that often turn out to be false or 
overstated.166 Although military exigencies may create a compelling 
need for genomic data, the data must be viewed with caution until 
they are adequately confirmed. This raises the question of under what 
circumstances the military is entitled to rely on genomic technologies 
that have not yet been fully tested, discussed in the following section. 
 
163. Manual for Courts-Martial United States, Rule 513(d)(6) (2012). 
164. Noah Levin, A Defense of Genetic Discrimination, 43 HASTINGS CTR. 
REP. 33 (2013). 
165. DODR 6025.18-R, supra note 109, at § C8.2.1. 
166. See, e.g., Joel N. Hirschhorn, A Comprehensive Review of Genetic 
Association Studies,4 GENET. MED. 45 (2002). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Issues in the Use of Genomic Technology by the U.S. Military  
157 
VI. Deployment Use of Unproven Genomic 
Technologies 
As described earlier, the military has an interest in giving troops 
gene-based technologies that could help protect them, treat injury and 
illness, and improve their performance. Earlier, this article discussed 
ethical and legal issues surrounding the testing of these interventions 
in military and civilian subjects. But the military might not want to 
pass up the opportunity to provide a promising genomic intervention 
to warfighters, especially those in harm’s way, even though the 
intervention had not undergone complete testing for safety and 
efficacy. 
A similar situation, although not involving genomic technologies, 
arose with the distribution of pyridostigmine bromide (PB) and 
botulinum toxoid (BT) vaccine to troops during the Gulf War, and 
with the DoD’s Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program (AVIP), 
which began in 1998. These modalities were given to troops to protect 
against chemical and biological weapons rather than solely to 
determine whether or not they actually worked. In other words, they 
were deployment uses rather than formal research studies. At the 
time, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had approved PB for 
treatment of myasthenia gravis, but not for protection against nerve 
agents,167 while at the start of the AVIP Program, the anthrax vaccine 
was approved by the FDA to protect against cutaneous exposure but 
not against the airborne exposure that DoD expected. (The FDA 
approved anthrax vaccine for all routes of exposure in 2004.168) 
Therefore, these were “off-label” or “unapproved” uses, a common 
medical practice. The FDA had not approved BT vaccine for any use 
at the time of the Gulf War, but the vaccine had an odd history; it 
was the only vaccine available against botulinum toxin, had been used 
by doctors to protect people against it for years, and was 
manufactured for that purpose by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention under an investigational new drug exemption,169 the 
 
167. William J. FitzPatrick & Lee L. Zwanziger, Defending Against 
Biochemical Warfare: Ethical Issues Involving the Coercive Use of 
Investigational Drugs and Biologics in the Military,3 J. PHIL. SCI. L. 1 
(2003). 
168. Parasidis, supra note 57. 
169. Statement of Randolph E. Wykoff, Assoc. Comm’r for Ops, Food & 
Drug Adm., on Medical, Chemical, and Biological Warfare 
Preparedness before the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, FOOD & 
DRUG ADM. (Mar. 17, 1998), http://www.fda.gov/ NewsEvents/ 
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FDA”s mechanism for allowing unapproved products to travel legally 
across state lines.170  
These deployment uses generated controversy over whether they 
should be voluntary, that is, whether troops should be allowed to 
refuse to take the drug and the vaccines. One concern was that 
making deployment use mandatory would encourage the military to 
use it to circumvent the informed consent requirements of formal 
research. Ultimately, Congress decided that drugs could be given to 
troops off-label only if a waiver of informed consent was issued by the 
President171 or under an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) granted 
by the FDA during a national emergency, and then not to all 
members of the armed forces but only to troops “in a particular 
military operation.”172 The same legal restrictions currently would 
apply to the deployment use of unapproved or off-label genomic 
technologies. In addition, the military should only seek a Presidential 
waiver or an EUA when the use of these genomic technologies would 
 
170. Some sources including the FDA and DoD itself described the Gulf War 
use of these drugs as “investigational.” FitzPatrick & Zwanziger, supra 
note 165. But this is a misnomer. FDA regulations define 
‘investigational’ as a drug or biological drug “that is used in a clinical 
investigation,” (21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b)) that is, in a safety and efficacy 
study conducted with human subjects. Neither PB nor BT vaccine was 
being studied in a formal clinical investigation; no manufacturer was 
conducting studies at the time, and most commentators do not consider 
the Gulf War use to be formal research, since although the DoD clearly 
was interested in seeing what effect PB and BT vaccines had on the 
troops who took them, the primary intent was to protect troops against 
attack rather than to produce generalizable knowledge. DoD evidently 
called the Gulf War uses “investigative” because it felt that its actions 
sufficiently resembled human subjects research that, under current law, 
the troops would need to give their informed consent before taking 
them. DoD deemed this to be impractical under combat conditions, but 
was concerned that proceeding without informed consent would be 
illegal and appear to violate the Nuremberg Code. It therefore asked the 
FDA to establish a special procedure whereby troops could be given the 
products without their consent. RICHARD A. RETTIG, MILITARY USE OF 
DRUGS NOT YET APPROVED BY THE FDA FOR CW/BW DEFENSE: 
LESSONS FROM THE GULF WAR (1990). The result was an “interim rule” 
permitting the Commissioner of the FDA to waive the need for informed 
consent so that DoD could use “investigational” products for military 
purposes. Food and Drug Administration, Informed Consent for Human 
Drugs and Biologics; Determination that Informed Consent is Not 
Feasible, 55 Fed. Reg. 52814 (1990). Gulf War veterans unsuccessfully 
challenged the interim rule in court [John Doe and Mary Doe v. 
Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 12 (USDC 1991); Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370 
(US App DC 1991)]. In 1999, Congress transferred the authority to 
grant the waiver from the Commission of the FDA to the President (10 
U.S.C. § 1107(f) (1999)). 
171. 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f) (1999). 
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be ethical, that is, when it would comply with the principles of 
proportionality, paternalism, and fairness. Commanders should 
carefully consider the available evidence concerning the risks and 
benefits of the technology in question and determine that there is no 
less risky alternative, so that imposing the risks on troops would be 
necessary in order to accomplish the mission. 
VII. The Role of Military Physicians 
With the possible exception of deployment uses, warfighter access 
to genomic technologies will be through a physician intermediary, 
whether as a researcher, clinician, or operator of a genomic testing 
program. This raises the question of what obligations military 
physicians owe to military personnel. Some commentators claim that 
physicians in the military should behave no differently than 
physicians in the civilian world and that the same ethical norms and 
legal rules should apply. The World Medical Association, for example, 
states that “medical ethics in times of armed conflict is identical to 
medical ethics in times of peace,”173 bioethicist Peter Clark asserts 
that “the failure of medical professionals to recognize that military 
and civic duty can never trump medical ethical principles is clearly an 
injustice,”174 and Sidel and Levy go so far as to claim that “it is 
morally unacceptable for a physician to serve as both a physician and 
a soldier in the United States military forces ...,”175 leaving open the 
question of who is going to provide medical services in the military. 
As noted earlier, the civilian bioethical principle that the welfare 
of the individual patient is the paramount is in conflict with the 
military principle that the welfare of the individual is subordinate to 
the welfare of the unit, the success of the mission, and the security of 
the state. As Edmund Howe emphasizes, “the military physician, at 
least implicitly, promises to support the mission or greater good when 
and if this is necessary, even if this requires subordinating the medical 
well-being of the individual soldier.”176 If military doctors acted 
according to civilian principles of bioethics when they provided 
services to their own troops, they might find themselves having to 
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violate the fundamental principle of military bioethics. Consequently, 
the rules governing military physicians cannot be the same as those 
that govern civilians. 
Military physicians are still medical professionals, however, and 
while this status cannot relieve them of their obligations as members 
of the military, it imposes on them a special obligation to look out for 
the interests of warfighters for whom they are responsible. Due to 
their medical expertise, they should be in a better position than 
nonphysicians to assess biomedical risks and benefits, and therefore 
they have a duty to apply their medical expertise to determine if a 
genomic risk that commanders seek to impose on their subordinates is 
disproportionate. If physicians disagree with the commanders” 
judgement, they must take the matter up the chain of command until 
they are satisfied that their professional concerns have received due 
consideration. As Canadian brigadier general and former director of 
Canadian military health services Hilary Jaeger states, “the military 
physician must act as a counterweight, by being the voice of caution,” 
and “should not hesitate to challenge when they are not satisfied.”177  
A prime example of the special protective role of military 
physicians in fact involves a genomic technology, a recombinant-
DNA-manufactured clotting agent called Factor VII.178 The army 
introduced the product into clinical practice in Iraq in 2004 before 
full-scale testing, which later revealed both safety problems, such as 
an increased risk of blot clots that could cause strokes179 and a lack of 
efficacy.180 Army physicians in Baghdad became concerned in 2006 
about the safety and efficacy of the clotting agent and urged their 
 
177. Hillary F. Jaeger, A Glance at the Tip of a Big Iceberg: Commentary on 
‘Recommendations for the Ethical use of Pharmacological Fatigue 
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B128 (2007). 
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pdf. 
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superiors in the medical chain of command to curtail its use. This led 
to rebukes from their superiors.181  
VIII. Genomic Enhancement 
Ethical and legal issues raised by military human subjects 
research on genomic enhancements were discussed earlier in Balancing 
Risks and Benefits. This section addresses the issues raised by giving 
genomic enhancements to troops outside of research, such as during 
training or deployment. Genomic enhancement technologies raise 
some of the same ethical and legal concerns that have been discussed 
in connection with other genomic technologies, for example, whether 
warfighters must be asked for informed consent. The question here is 
whether the fact that the genomic technology is an enhancement 
rather than medically related calls for different treatment. 
Generally speaking, the answer is no. The fact that a genomic test 
seeks information about a warfighter’s physical or mental abilities 
rather than their risk for genomic disease, for example, does not alter 
the ground rules for military genomic testing described in Genomic 
Testing, which mandate that any risks from the testing be 
proportionate to the military’s need for the information and that 
superiors protect the warfighter’s welfare to the greatest extent 
possible. The same is true for a genomic intervention such as a 
recombinant-DNA-manufactured drug, an example of which would be 
erythropoietin, which provides greater endurance by increasing the 
oxygen supply to tissues, or even a direct genomic manipulation that 
aims to improve warfighter performance. In all these cases, the same 
considerations of safety, efficacy, proportionality, paternalism, and 
fairness obtain. 
One reason for not making special rules for genomic enhancement 
is that the distinction between an enhancement and other sorts of 
genomic technologies is difficult to make. Consider a recombinant 
drug that improves mental ability or endurance. Is this an 
enhancement or a preventive medical measure that helps prevent 
warfighters from becoming ill or injured? Some commentators argue 
that an enhancement is something that enables an individual to 
exceed population norms for the characteristic or ability. Thus, a drug 
to improve cognitive function in persons with below-normal cognitive 
ability would not be considered an enhancement. But the concept of 
normality is elusive. In some cases, it refers to the frequency with 
which a trait or capability occurs within a population. In regard to 
height, the convention is to regard individuals who are more than two 
standard deviations below the mean height of the population as being 
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of short stature.182 In other circumstances, what is considered normal 
may have no relationship to the distribution of a trait. For example, 
normal eyesight is deemed to be 20/20, but only about 35 percent of 
adults have 20/20 vision without some form of correction.183 Standards 
of normality also may vary from place to place and time to time, and 
can be expected to change as the use of enhancements increases. Body 
shapes that were considered healthy a 100 years ago, for instance, are 
now considered obese. Furthermore, the concepts of disease and 
disorder themselves may be hard to pin down. Before 1973, the 
American Psychiatric Association regarded homosexuality as a mental 
disorder.184 Moreover, there is a tendency to regard more and more 
health states as diseases and more and more interventions as 
treatments. Instead of attempting to make a brightline distinction 
between enhancements and other techniques, the emphasis should be 
on the effect of the intervention on the well-being of the warfighters 
who receive the intervention, the welfare of their units, and the 
completion of the mission. 
Are there certain types of biomedical enhancements that should 
be out of bounds in the military? Arguably enhancements should not 
compromise warfighter dignity by producing socially stigmatizing or 
disfiguring physical characteristics. In the debate about the ethics and 
legality of human genomic engineering, one technology that causes 
particular concern, for example, is intermixing human and animal 
DNA.185 Critics object that even using this technology to combat 
disease, let alone for enhancement purposes, should be prohibited due 
to the risk of creating monsters186 and blurring the line between 
humans and other animals.187 On the other hand, an argument can be 
made that the benefits from giving warfighters an eagle’s daytime 
vision, an owl’s night vision, a dog’s sense of smell, a gorilla’s 
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strength, or a cheetah’s speed might be so great that they should not 
be ruled out of the question. From a technical standpoint, however, it 
may well be necessary to produce such changes at a sufficiently early 
stage of embryonic development that the alterations showed up in all 
of the resulting individual’s cells, including their reproductive cells, 
and therefore would be passed on to their descendants.188 In short, 
germ line genomic engineering. This is another genomic approach that 
meets with strong objections, including that it could cause 
inadvertent harm to future generations.189 The question then would be 
whether the military ought to be allowed to produce modifications 
that made the offspring of their personnel especially valuable as 
warfighters if the same types of changes were forbidden in the general 
population. This scenario is sufficiently far in the future that it 
doesn’t have to be resolved at this time, but one conclusion that 
seems certain even now is that such modifications would be unethical 
without the warfighter’s informed consent. 
Another ethical issue is what effect genomic enhancement use 
should have on promotions, commendations, and other rewards within 
the military. If warfighters are required to take the enhancements, 
then it does not seem justified to deprive them of resulting service 
benefits so long as access to the enhancements is fairly distributed. 
On the other hand, if warfighters use enhancements voluntarily, the 
situation might be thought to resemble enhancements in sport, where 
it is argued that abilities or accomplishments attributable in 
substantial part to enhancements do not deserve reward. As in the 
case of sports, however, one must inquire why from an ethical 
standpoint biomedical enhancements should be treated differently 
than permissible performance improving practices such as dietary 
modification and extreme training. Moreover, unlike in sport, where 
the use of enhancements may confer benefits on individual athletes 
and teams but produce little or no broader societal benefit, 
enhancements in the military could help protect warfighters and their 
comrades from harm, and aid them in accomplishing missions deemed 
to be in the national interest. In terms of the impact on military 
rewards, then, the willingness of warfighters to incur health risks from 
enhancements in order to benefit others as well as themselves might 
be deemed to be praiseworthy. 
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An additional concern is the potential for genomic enhancement 
technology to migrate from the military to the civilian sector. The 
successful development of enhancements for the military is likely to 
become publicly known and create pressure to make them available to 
civilians, including from entities that have a proprietary interest in 
the technologies. Warfighters also might illegally distribute 
enhancements that they were given for military use to family 
members and other civilians. Just as the military legitimately 
prohibits public access to properly classified information and 
dangerous weaponry, it would be appropriate to prevent the public 
from gaining access to military enhancements that were overly 
dangerous or that were so effective that it would threaten national 
security if they became available to adversaries. 
A final question is whether warfighters should be allowed to 
benefit from being enhanced after they are discharged from the 
military or retire. The ability to do so, for example, might be used as 
a recruiting incentive, similar to being taught technical skills. A 
fairness issue would arise, however, if former warfighters continued to 
enjoy advantages from enhancements that were not readily available 
to civilians because they were illegal or too expensive. On the one 
hand, continued advantage might seem unfair to civilians who were 
not eligible for military service. On the other hand, enhancement 
advantages could be viewed as a legitimate part of warfighters” 
compensation package, especially if they were in combat or had been 
given other especially risky assignments. Similar considerations arise 
in connection with other veterans benefits such as government-
subsidized college education, job preferences, and access to VA care; 
in all cases, the public must decide whether the benefits are justified 
based on factors such as the need for military volunteers and the 
value of the benefit compared to what is available to civilians. In the 
case of genomic enhancements, an additional issue is how difficult or 
dangerous it would be to remove or cancel the effect of the 
warfighter’s enhancement. 
IX. Conclusion 
Although genomic technologies could produce significant benefits 
for the military and its individual members, they must be subject to 
appropriate ethical and legal constraints. The bioethical principles 
that underlie these constraints differ between military and civilian 
contexts, and therefore the rules that govern the military use of 
genomic technologies also must be different. 
Given the exigencies of military operations and national security, 
the military in many respects deserves to have greater freedom to 
conduct research using military subjects, obtain genomic information 
from military personnel, create and establish military geno–
phenobanks, and provide genomic therapies and enhancements to 
warfighters than would be ethically acceptable in civilian biomedical 
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contexts. Nevertheless, warfighters deserve to be respected and to 
have their welfare maximized as much as possible under the 
circumstances. The essence of military bioethics is the duty of 
superiors to protect their subordinate’s welfare and impose risks on 
them only to the extent that the risk is appropriate in light of the 
military benefits to be gained. Given the scientific uncertainty 
surrounding many aspects of genomics, public sensitivity to genomic 
misconduct, and the importance of maintaining an effective voluntary 
military force, adherence to these principles in the realm of genomics 
is especially critical. 
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